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A Linguistic Argument for Indeterministic Futures' 
Bridget Copley 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Philosophers since Aristotle have debated whether the the concept of the future should he 
treated as deterministic or indeterministic - whether it is already decided what will take 
place in the future, or whether it is genuinely open. Although there are good philosophical 
arguments for indeterminism, for most purposes in compositional semantics, the simpler 
deterministic models have been sufficient. In this paper, however, I argue that in some 
languages, an indeterministic model is necessary, in order to account for the behavior of 
future modals under what are apparently aspectual operators. Of course, this result has 
nothing to say about the actual ontology of the future, only about its semantic 
representation in certain languages.' 
In particular, I will argue that the future operator found in both English be going 
to and will must support at least some indeterminacy. First, in section 1, I argue that the 
denotation of be going to results from the combination of a progressive operator and a 
future operator. In the second, briefer section, I argue that the future operator in be going 
• I would like to thank Elena Goerzoni, Norvin Richards, Sabine latridou, Kai von Fintel, Irene 
Heim, Noarn Chomsky, Michela Ippolito. and Patrick Hawley for enlightening discussions on the material 
in this paper; and many native English speakers at MIT for judgments. I am also grateful to Wendy Ham, 
Natanaol Peranginangin, Yon.than Thio. and Diana Yuliyanti for Indonesian judgments. I would further 
like 10 thank participants at the UiL·OTS Perspectives on Aspect conference. and of Course at NELS 32, for 
their comments. Any errors and omissions are my own. 
, Even within a language. this result does not distinguish hetween the two sides of the philosophical 
debate: the side that treats the future as onO/logically deterministic admits that the fUlUre is in some sense 
indeterministic, but treats the indeterminacy as epistemic In this paper. I will use an onto logically 
indeterministic future! but an epistemicalJy indeterministic future would work as well. provided the case 
could he made for epistemic operators as low in the structure as the future operator (but see Cinque 1999. 
von Fintel & latridou 2001. e.g .. for evidence that epistemic modals are found higher). 
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to has to be indetenninistic, and finally, drawing from Copley (2001), that be going to 
and will share the same future operator. 
1. The meaning of be going to 
The purpose of this section is to argue that be going to (henceforth bgt) is composed of a 
progressive operator and a future operator. Later, in section 2, we will see that precisely 
this combination constrains our choice of future operators to indeterministic ones. But I 
will start by presenting a puzzle which can be explained by this combination. 
1.1 A puzzle about offering 
Driving along the highway in California one day, I saw a billboard advertising a 
mechanic's shop in Madera. It included the sentence in (1a). The puzzle is: Why couldn't 
it instead have included the sentence in (1b)? 
(I) A sign seen (and one not seen) on the highway 
a. We'll change your oil in Madera. 
b. # We're going to change your oil in Madera. 
The relevant component of the context is that the author of the billboard is making an 
offer. The difference between (I a) and (I b) seems to be that will can be used to make an 
offer, while bgt cannot; (lb) sounds more like the author of the billboard is infonning the 
motorist of a fact, or indeed making a threat, rather than making an offer. So the puzzle 
becomes: Why can't bgt be used to make an offer? 
Suppose we consider in more depth what it is to make an offer. The nature of 
offering implies that the eventuality being volunteered by the speaker is not necessarily 
going to happen anyway. It would certainly be rude for someone to make an assertion, in 
the appropriate context, that entails that in some worlds where you do not want them to 
change your oil, they do it anyway. For an utterance to count as an act of offering, the 
volunteered eventuality must be contingent on the interlocutor's preferences. 
Let's assume the following pragmatic condition on acts (speech or otherwise) that 
are offers. 
(2) Condition on offers. A person has offered to bring about Q for you only if they 
can, consistently with their other utterances, assert both: 
a. If (at some point) you want Q, Q will be the case. 
b. If (at some point) you want not-Q, not-Q will be the case. 
The point here is that both the antecedent and the consequent must have the same time of 
evaluation; the time at which your wanting Q is evaluated must be the same time that the 
hearer is prepared to carry out Q. The parenthetical is there because what matters for the 
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offer is not whether you want Q now. Suppose someone says they will bring you food 
tomorrow if you are hungry now, and won't if you are not hungry now. But perhaps you 
are full now; that means the speaker will not bring you any food tomorrow! Under the 
assumption that your being hungry now does not have anything to do with whether you 
are hungry tomorrow, this speech act is not a real act of offering. 
Naturally, there are other felicity conditions as well (note the "only if"). For 
example, the speaker must helieve that they can bring about Q, and so forth. These will 
not concern us here. 
Returning to our billboard, we can now say that in order for the author of the 
billboard to truly be making an offer, they must be able to assert both of the following: 
(3) a If you want us to change your oil in Madera, we will change your oil in 
Madera. 
b. If you don't want us to change your oil in Madera, we won't change your 
oil in Madera. 
Let's assume that the utterance (I a) really is (3a), but with the antecedent elided. Then a 
revised version of our billboard utterances would be in (4); (4b) sounds odd or rude. 
(4) Revision of the billboard utterances 
a. (If you want us to change your oil in Madera,) we will change your oil in 
Madera. 
b. #(If you want us to change your oil in Madera,) we are going to change your 
oil in Madera. 
Having gotten this far, what can we say about our puzzle? The speaker of the will 
sentence in (l a) (or the conditionals in (3a) and (4a)) can of course also assert (3b), which 
fits nicely with the intuition that a will sentence can be an offer, because in order to make 
an offer, one must be able to assert both (3a) and (3b). As for bgt, we would like to know 
whether the speaker of (Ib) (or (4b» can assert both (3a) and (3b), the conditions on 
offering. There seems to be no problem with the speaker of (I b)/(4b) asserting (3a). 
Rather, the problem seems to be that the speaker of (Ib)/(4b) cannot then agree with the 
statement in (3b). So the final version of our puzzle is: Why wouldn't the speaker of 
(I b)/(4b) be able to agree with (3b)? 
1.2 Proposal 
I would like to propose that bgt consists of a progressive (PROG) and a future operator 
(wall, following Abush (1985) and many others), as in (5a). Will and would, forthe sake 
of comparison, are as in (5b); the difference between will and would is one of tense. 
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Let's consider these components in tum.' 
The morpheme to will be ignored, since it seems not to have an independent 
syntactic existence of its own (Copley, 200\). 
The progressive in bgt is realized as be -ing, though it need not have exactly the 
same meaning as the progressive that is found on main verbs. In fact, it is an empirical 
question whether it does or not; for now I will use a very simple progressive (based on 
Bennett and Partee, 1978, except with the relation between the intervals limited to proper 
inclusion, following Klein (1997», and leave to later investigation (Copley, in progress) 
the question of how the progressive in bgt relates to the main verb progressive. 
(6) A simple progressive (modified from Bennett & Partee, 1978) 
For any interval i and world w, 
IIPROG PU;w= I iff 3j::) i: [P(j)(w)] 
2 The formal denotations are in an intentional system based on the compositional semantic 
fTamework of Heim & Kratzer (1998). As usual, there is a valuation function "II 11" that takes a 
morphosyntactic object and returns a denotation. The intentionality is achieved through evaluation times 
(type i, variables i, j, k, etc.) and worlds (type w, variables w, w', etc.), written as superscripts On the 
valuation function. Truth values are type t, and propositions are type <i,<w,t». I will assume the VP· 
internal subject hypothesis (Koopman & Sportiche 1988), and ignore movement of the subject out of the 
VP; this last move will enable us to forgo variable assignments. A VP is expressed by an italized uppercase 
letter (P, Q, etc.), and its denotation (a proposition) is expressed by the same letter, bot not italicized (P, Q, 
etc.). 
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That is, IIPRoG PII" = I iff on world w, there is an interval j which properly includes i, 
such that P holds over j. 
(7) 
The future operator in bgt is realized as go. As I have argued elsewhere (Copley, 2001), 
and will argue below, it has the same meaning as the future operator in will, which has 
been called "wolf'. For the meaning of woll, here is a version of the Thomason (1970) 
branching time future operator. 
(8) A complex future (Thomason, 1970) 
For any instant i and world w, 1IRn' QII i. 
= I if 'tw', w' a world that agrees with w up to i: 
[3k: [i < k and Q(k)( w') = I]]; 
= 0 if 'tw', w' a world that agrees with w up to i: 
-[3k: [i < k and Q(k)( w') = Ill; 
and is undefined otherwise. 
The notion of two worlds "agreeing" is defined as follows: A world w agrees with 
a world w' up to a time i just in case for all propositions P, for all times j ~ i, P(j)(w) = I 
if and only if P(j)( w'). 
What (8) says is that for any instant i and world w, IIFUT Qll i• is defined just in 
case all the worlds share a truth value for Q at the time in question. If IIFUT QII~ is 
defined, it is true if on all worlds that agree with w up to i, there is some time k which is 
later than i, at which Q is true; and it is false if on all worlds that agree with w up to i, 
there is no time k which is later than i at which Q is true. 
If we were to envision worlds as timelines, and disagreement between two worlds 
as a binary branching, we might represent the set of worlds quantified over by FUT, 
evaluated at i and the actual world, as in the diagram below (which shows a state of 
affairs in which IIFuT QII'w is true). 
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Now that we have introduced the players, the question becomes, what happens if we stack 
the progressive on top of the future? Recall that our denotation of the progressive 
composed with a VP P. evaluated at i and w, yields a truth value of I just in case P holds 
over a superinterval of i in w (j, in the denotation of PROG). For present purposes, we 
would like to consider the case where P = Fut Q. This means that tbe evaluation time for 
Fut Q is not a point, as in Thomason's original conception, but at an interval: j, a 
superinterval of i, where i is the time of evaluation of the entire expression PROG FUT Q. 
As things stand this cannot be done. Thomason's future is defined over instants, 
not intervals, and what the progressive gives it is an interval. This conflict is, however, 
easily remedied. To put Thomason's future under the Bennett & Partee progressive, we 
need to make sure that the result of feeding FUT Q an interval is defined. One way to fix 
this problem is to alter the denotation of PUT to say that FUT quantifies over all the worlds 
that branch off from w at any time during the interval of evaluation; i.e., that agree with 
w at least up to the beginning of the interval of evaluation. The changes in the definition 
below are italicized: 
(10) Thomason future redefined for intervals 
For any interval i and world w, IIFUT QW' 
= 1 if "Iw', w' a world that agrees with w up to the beginning ofi: 
[3k: [i < k and Q(k)(w') = 1]]; 
= 0 if "Iw', w' a world that agrees with w up to the beginning of i: 
-[3k: [i < k and Q(k)(w') = 1]]; 
and is undefined otherwise. 
This allows us to compose PROG with FUT Q, because the new denotation for FUT Q is a 
function that takes an interval as its evaluation time. We would represent the worlds 
quantified over by bgt (= PROG + PUT), evaluated at i, as below in (11). Bgt quantifies 
over not only the worlds that PUT quantifies over, but also over worlds that branch off 
during j but before i. Thus a bgt sentence actually makes a stronger claim than the 
corresponding sentence with PuT does. 
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(II) Worlds quantified over by be going to 
(= PROG + FUT) 
The meaning of bgt would be as follows: 
(12) IIPROGFUTQII'· 









= I iff 3j:::l i: [\;tw', w' a world that agrees with w up to the beginning of j: 
[3k: [j < k and Q(k)( w') = I]]); 
= 0 if 3j:::l i: [\;tw', w' a world that agrees with w up to the beginning of j: 
[3k: [j < k and Q(k)( w') = 1m; 
and is undefined otherwise. 
59 
We are now in a position to return to the puzzle about offering and explain why 
the speaker of (4b) (i.e., (lb) with the elided antecedent made explicit) cannot· 
consistently assert (3b) (both repeated below). 
(4) b. #CIf you want us to change your oil in Madera,) we're going to change your 
oil in Madera. 
(3) b. (But) if you don't want us to change your oil in Madera, we won't change 
your oil in Madera. 
Let: 
7
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P = the proposition expressed by you want us to change your oil in Madera (in 
the context in question) 
Q = the proposition expressed by we change your oil in Madera (in the context in 
question) 
i = a time possibly after the time of reading the billboard 
(4b) and (3b) turn out as follows:' 
(14) a. 
b. 
[If P, PROG FuT Q](i) 
[If -P, FUT -Q](i) 
Assuming that conditionals quantify over possible worlds (Kratzer, 1986), what we really 
mean is the following: 
(15) a. 
b. 
All worlds w such that P(i)(w) are such that [PROG FUT Q](i)(w) 
All worlds w such that -P(i)(w) are such that [FUT -Q](i)(w) 
Recall our intuition that (the English versions of) (ISa,b) are incompatible. I will show 
now how the current proposal derives this intuition. 
Suppose now we consider one of the worlds that makes P true at i, and represent it 
with a horizontal line that branches off at i. We can imagine possible worlds in which P is 
not true at i (i.e., assuming contradictory negation, worlds in which not-P is true at i). 
These worlds branch off before i. Of course, not all of the worlds that branch off before i 
are worlds that make not-P true at i; some of the worlds that branch off before i make P 
true at i. In general, for any interval j which properly includes i, there will be some worlds 
that branch off from the actual world during j such that not-P is true at i. This state of 
affairs is represented below: 
(16) 
, Any issues arising from the interaction of negation with the future will be glossed over here; what 
is written in (l4b) is accurate and plausible enough for our purposes. 
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Now, let us further suppose that (15a) is true. So in this case, on any world that makes P 
true at i, there is an interval j such that all the worlds that branch off during j make Q true 
at some later interval k. This state of affairs is gi ven below. 
(17) Q 
Q 
But now notice that in a situation in which (l5a) is true, there can be a -P world that is 
also a world in which Q will happen at some future time k; I have circled two such 
worlds. This is inconsistent with the condition in (l5b) that all -P worlds are worlds in 
which -Q will happen at k (assuming that Q and not-Q are inconsistent at the future time 
k). That, then, is why bgt sentences like the one in (lb) (=(I5b» can't be used to make an 
offer. This incompatibility with a condition on offering explains the infelicity of a bgt 
sentence such as (lb) in this context, and is the correct characterization of the puzzle. 
That this is the right approach to the puzzle becomes clear when we consider 
contexts in which not-P worlds are non-existent. In these contexts, bgt sentences 
suddenly don't sound so rude. Consider, for example, another possible billboard (suppose 
you are already in Madera): 
(18) We're going to make you happy in Madera 
It is safe for the speaker to assume that there are no not-P worlds; that is, conceivably 
there are no possible worlds in which you don't want to be happy. The utterance of (18) 
doesn't entail that any not-P worlds are Q worlds. Hence no contradiction emerges. 
The puzzle illustrated in this section, i.e., that bgt cannot be used to make an offer, 
provided empirical support to the proposal that this construction involves two 
9
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ingredients: progressive and (an indeterministic) future. Indeed the semantic result of 
composing these two operators is incompatible with what it means to make an offer. 
1.3 A potential alternative analysis 
Before moving on, I would like to remark on a potential alternate hypothesis for the 
difference between be going to and will in their ability to be used for offers, which will 
lead to a short digression. 
We know that will has a second meaning, also called a "dispositional use". The 
sentence in (19a) has a reading on which what is claimed is not that John, at some point 
in the future, will eat beans, but rather that he is willing or disposed to eat beans. Bgt 
apparently cannot express anything about John's dispositions; (I9b) can only be a claim 
about the future. 
(19) a. John will eat beans. 
b. John is going to eat beans. 
The question that arises at this point is whether the difference between will and bgl in 
offering contexts is rather due to the availability of dispositional readings, since plausibly 
making an offer might have something to do with being willing to follow through on the 
offer. 
When we look at languages other than English, we discover that such a unified 
account is actually undesirable. Indonesian, for example, has two future particles, akan 
and mau, and in at least some dialects, these two particles correspond to will and bgl 
respectively in many, but not all, ways.' First, as in English, one of the futures resists 
certain present tense contexts (Copley, 2001): 
(20) a. #Oh look, it'll rain. 
b. Oh look, it's going to rain. 
(21) a. #Aduh, akan hujan. 
Oh.look wall rain 
'Oh look, it'll rain' 
b. Aduh, mau hujan. 
Oh.look,bgl rain 
'Oh, it's going to rain.' 
Second, and most crucially, one can be used to make an offer, and one cannot. For 
example, (22a) could be used to respond to "I need a volunteer. Who will make coffee?" 
• In other dialects, both behave like bgt. 
10
North East Linguistics Society, Vol. 32 [2002], Art. 5
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol32/iss1/5
A Linguistic Argument far Indeterministic Futures 63 
The sentence in (22b) could not, unless the answerer was already going to make coffee 
(regardless of what the asker wanted). 
(22) a. Saya akan membuat kopi. 
I wall make coffee 
'I'll make coffee.' (offer ok) 
b. Saya mau membuat kopi. 
I bgt make coffee 
'I'm going to make coffee.' (offer not possible; only possible as 
description of pre-existing plan)' 
In these respects it appears that akan is much like will (wall, really, since there is no 
present tense) and mau is much like bgt. However, when we tum to the possibility of 
dispositional uses, the situation is reversed. It is rnau that has a dispositional use, not 
alam. 
(23) a Ali akan makan ikan. 
Ali wall eat fish 
'Ali will eat fish (later)' 
*' Ali is willing to eat fish.' 
b. Ali mau makan ikan. 
Ali bgt eat fish 
'Ali is going to eat fish.' 
'Ali is willing to eat fish.' 
Given this, while we might have thought that the two phenomena under consideration 
(offering and willingness) were naturally related, the Indonesian data show that these two 
phenomena can be disjoint. This makes the alternative hypothesis a much less attractive 
as the germ of a (so far non-cxistent) explanation for the English facts about offering, 
since whatever the explanation is, it won't work for Indonesian; on the other hand, the 
explanation I have proposed can be used to capture the facts of both languages (leaving 
the dispositional use in both languages unexplained). 
So far we have seen that the PROG + FUT analysis of bgt accounts for the fact that 
bgt cannot typically be used to make an offer. This analysis turned on the idea that 
(normally) the use of bgt in the consequent of a conditionallf P bgt Q entails that some 
-p worlds are Q worlds. In sections 1.4 and 1.5, we will examine other kinds of 
conditionals that have something to say about -P worlds, and demonstrate further 
differences between will and bgt that can be explained in a similar fashion. Specifically, 
'In the dialects in which both aJwn and rna" behave like bg/, bisa 'can' is what is used to make an 
offer. E.g. Saya bisa m.mbllill /copi, 'I can make coffee.' 
11
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section 1.4 deals with relevance conditionals, and section 1.5 treats causal and acausal 
contexts. 
1.4 Relevance conditionals 
Relevance conditionals are conditionals in which the antecedent seems to be a condition 
on the relevance to the hearer of the information in the consequent. Some examples of 
relevance conditionals are given below. 
(24) Relevance conditionals 
a. If you want to know, there's some beer in the fridge. 
b. If I may be frank, Frank is not looking good. 
Differently from various other kinds of conditional utterances, the speaker of a relevance 
conditional if P, Q is certainly not committed to if not-P, not-Q. 
(25) a. 
b. 
If you don 'I want to know, there isn't any beer in the fridge. 
If I may not be frank, Frank is looking good. 
Therefore, in the context in which a relevance conditional if P, Q is uttered, not all not-P 
worlds are not-Q worlds. That is, some not-P worlds are Q worlds. But actually, a 
stronger entailment can be demonstrated, namely, all not-P worlds are Q worlds. Iatridou 
(1994) notes that then does not appear in relevance conditionals. 
(26) a. 
b. 
*If you're interested, (then) there's some beer in the fridge. 
*If r may be frank, (then) Frank is not looking good. 
Iatridou argues that the use of then in a conditional if P, then Q presupposes that not all 
not-P worlds are Q worlds. Therefore the impossibility of adding then to a relevance 
conditional if p, Q must signify that all not-P worlds are Q worlds. Recall that the use of 
bgt (normally) entails that some not-P worlds are Q worlds. 
The prediction we make is that bgt should be possible in relevance conditionals, 
since if all not-P worlds are Q worlds. some not-P worlds are Q worlds. The prediction is 
borne out. Compare (27a) and (27b). While the conditional in (27a), using will, is not a 
good relevance conditional (but makes a fine offer), the conditional in (27b). using bgt, is 
a good relevance conditional (and as expected, is not a good offer). 
(27) a. If you're interested, we'll go get some beer. (*relevance, ok offer) 
b. If you're interested, we're going to go get some beer. (ok relevance. *offer) 
12
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1.5 Acausal and causal contexts 
We have just seen that relevance conditionals discriminate between will and bgt sentences 
in a way that is expected by my proposal. In this section we will consider conditionals 
that can occur in both acausal and causal contexts, and find another difference between 
bgt and will. Suppose that you are planning to talk to an eccentric professor whom you 
have not yet met. A fellow student tells you: 
(28) If he hits his forehead with his hand ... 
a. . .. he's going to tell you something important. 
b. . .. he11 tell you something important. 
Note that (28a) and (2gb) are different with respect to an acausal context (though not with 
respect to a causal context): 
(29) a. 
b. 
Acausal context: The forehead-hitting lets you know that he is about to tell 
you something important. (28a) only 
Causal context: The forehead-hitting causes him to say important things 
(so try to contrive a way to get him to hit his forehead.) (28a,b) 
To prove to yourself that the causal context is really possible with bgt, consider (30), 
which only supports a causal context (it is not plausible that an action you perform should 
be an indication to you about the professor's likely behavior). 
(30) If you hit his forehead with your hand, he's going to tell you something important. 
Similarly, the sentences in (3Ia) and (31b) differ a~ well. Once again, in the acausal 
context only bgt is possible, while in the causal context either bgt or will is possible. 
(31) If the baby cries ... 
a. . .. she's going to spit up. 
b. .,. she'll spit up. 
(32) a. 
b. 
Acausal context: The crying tells you that she is about to spit 
up. (31 a) only 
Causal context: The crying causes her to spit up (so don't let her cry). 
(3Ja,b) 
Similarly, (33) confirms that bgt really is possible in the causal context. 
(33) If you hold the baby horizontally, she's going to spit up. 
13
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What causes the difference between bg/ and will in acausal contexts? Remember that in 
the consequent of a conditional, bgt makes a claim about the not-P worlds, but will does 
not. As we did for offering and relevance contexts, let's try to determine what acausal and 
causal contexts entail for the not-P worlds. A first try might look something like the 
following: 
(34) Cause condition (firs//ry); ifP causes Q, not all not-P worlds are Q worlds 
(because there might be another cause for Q) 
However, this condition is not correct, because of the apparent inference, if inference it is, 
from (35a) to (35b). It seems that other causes for the consequent (someone else striking 
the match, spontaneous combustion, etc.) are not considered. 
(35) a. If you strike this match, it will light. 
b. If you don't strike this match, it won't light. 
What needs to be added is the restriction of the quantification over possible worlds, not 
just to accessible possible worlds, but to those that are closest to the actual world 
(Kratzer, 1986). This yields (36) for our cause condition: 
(36) Cause condition (second try); if P causes Q, all (appropriately restricted) not-P 
worlds are not-Q worlds 
Recall that the use of bgt in a conditional if p, bgt Q, typically entails that some not-P 
worlds are Q worlds. Thus we predict that bgt should be possible in acausal contexts, but 
not in causal contexts. The prediction that bgt is possible in acausal contexts is borne out, 
which is good news for the proposal. But unexpectedly, bgt appears to also be possible in 
causal contexts. This possibility appears at first to be a problem for the present proposal. 
Let's look more closely at what happens in these cases. 
I, and some of the other English speakers I have asked, have the intuition that in 
the causal cases, bgt actually takes scope over the entire conditional in (30), (33), and the 
causal context readings of (28Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference 
source not found.a) and (31a). What is already going to happen is the following: if P, Q. 
If this intuition is correct, then with the aspectual semantics removed from the 
conditional, the sentence no longer makes any claim about not-P worlds. It merely claims 
that IIFut [if P, QjlliW for some j which includes the time of utterance. Therefore, there is 
no conflict with the cause condition. 
If this story is right, we would also expect to be able to use the same trick to force 
an offer reading of a bgt sentence. And in fact, we can: 
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(37) Wide scope bgt used to make an offer: 
We're going to take good care of you in Madera. If you want a manicure, we're 
going to give you a manicure. If you want an oil change, we're going to change 
your oil. 
67 
These conditionals do present the manicure and the oil change as contingent on the 
hearer's desires. What is not negotiable is the idea that the speaker is going to take care of 
the hearer. Much more could be said here pursuing this suggestion that bgt takes wide 
scope, but for now I will leave it to further research (but see Copley, in progress). 
To conclude this first part of the paper: I have shown that a PROG + FUT analysis 
of bgt explains the distribution of bgl in four different kinds of conditional contexts: 
offering, relevance conditionals, acausal contexts, and causal contexts: The future 
operator we have been using is Thomason's indeterministic operator. In the next section, 
I will first show that an indeterministic future operator would not work as the future 
component of bgt, and then present arguments (following Copley (2001» that the future 
operator in bgt is the same as wall, the future operator in will. Thus I will have argued 
that wall must be indeterministic. 
2 Wall is indeterministic 
First, it is necessary to define these terms that I have been using, "deterministic" and 
"indeterministic" . 
(38) For any operator F, verb phrase p, world w, time i: 
a. F is a deterministic future operator iff the truth of IIFPlI'· entails the truth 
of IIFPllj• for all j < i. 
b. F is an indeterministic future operator iff the truth of IIFPII" does not entail 
the truth of IIFPI!'" for all j < i. 
Intuitively. if a future operator is deterministic. claims about the future using that operator 
are always either true or false (though We may not know which). and the truth value of a 
claim about the future does not change over time. So if a claim about the future is true, it 
has always been true. But if a future operator is indeterministic. a claim about the future 
using that operator might be true now, without having always been true. 
As mentioned above. most semlmtic work on futures has assumed deterministic 
models. The project now is to first argue that the future operator in bgt has to be 
indeterministic, and then to argue that the future operator is the same as wall. to get the 
result that wall must be indeterministic .. 
, For other evidence that there actually is a progressive in bgt. see also Copley (2001). 
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2.1 The future operator in bgt is indeterministic 
Suppose instead of Thomason's indetenninistic future operator, we try a detenninistic 
future operator in bgt, FUT o' The reader can easily verify that FUT 0 is, in fact, a 
deterministic future operator, and with a little more difficulty. verify also that 
Thoma~on's future is indeterministic. 
(39) IIFUTo QlI" = I iff3k> i: [Q(k)(w)] 
Composing FUTo with our progressive yields the following: 
(40) IIbgt,,1I = IIPROG FUT 0 QII'" 
= I iff 3j ::::>i: [IiFUTo QII'"] 
= I iff 3j ~ i: [3k: > j: [Q(k)(h)]] 





FUT 0 ~ bgtn: If an interval i precedes an interval k, there will always be 
an interval j that includes i and precedes k. 
Bgtn ~ FUTo If an interval j precedes an interval k, there will always be 
an interval i included in j that also precedes k. 
] 
Recall that we have been assuming, following Abusch (1985) and many others, that will 
= PRES + wall. In addition, I have argued that bgt = PROG + a future operator. Under the 
additional assumption that wall is the future operator in bgt, we would expect will and bgt 
sentences to be truth-conditionally equivalent. But we have seen that that is not the case. 
Contra (41 a), as we have seen above, bgt cannot always be used when will can be used 
(as in, say, the offering examples discussed above, or the causal contexts without bgt 
taking wide scope).' 
7 The proposal from section 1 falsifies (41a). because bgt quantifies over a set of worlds which 
includes the set that will quantifies over. It also makes (4Ib) true; but this is all right. as long as a 
morphological blocking or Gricean account can be invoked to say why if bgt can be used, it must be used (if 
indeed that IS true). 
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To summarize. a deterministic future does not capture the correct relation between 
bgt and will. By using an indeterministic operator. however. bgt sentences are correctly 
predicted to make a stronger claim than will sentences. What remains is to argue that woll 
is precisely the future operator in bgt. 
2.2 The future operator in bgt is woll 
While I do not have anything approaching a watertight argument that the future operator 
in bgt is woll. there are two pieces of circumstantial evidence that point in that direction. 
following Copley (2001). At the very least, there are two properties that bgt and 
will/would share with each other that other kinds of future reference (modals. futurates) 
do not share. Combining this result with the conclusions of sections I and 2.1 will allow 
us to conclude that woll must be indeterministic. 
It is a fact about would. due originally to Stowell. that matrix would is 
ungrammatical when the event has not actually happened by the time of utterance. Indeed 
that is what (43a) entails. as we see from the fact that (43b) is something of a 
contradiction. 
(43) a. This little boy would grow up to be king. 
b. *This little boy would grow up to be king. but he didn'. 
Other examples are below: 
(44) a. 
b. 
*Pedro would pitch the following day. but then he caught a cold and didn't. 
*Pedro would pitch a perfect game the following day. but then he caught a 
cold and didn't. 
Let's call this the' 'matrix would observation": 
(45) Matrix would observation (MWO): 
would P ~ PAST P 
Note that there is no corresponding matrix will observation such that will P ~ PRES P. 
So we will have to compare past tense be going to (waslwere going to, wgt) and would. 
rather than present tense bgt and will. 
Is there a corresponding observation for wgt? At first glance there appears not to 
be. because (46a). which is of the form wgt P & PAST P, is good. But on the other hand, 
(46b) is not good.' 
• Speakers may find (46b) acceptable on the assumption that Pedro has some control over whether 
he pitches a perfect game or not. Those speakers may find it easier to exclude the possibility that rain can be 
controlled or planned; (i) makes the same point as (46b). 
(i) "It was going to rain yesterday, but then it dido\. 
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Pedro was going to pitch the following day, but then he caught a cold and 
didn't. 
*Pedro was going to pitch a perfect game the following day, but then he 
caught a cold and didn'. 
The difference between the event in (46a) and the event in (46b) is that the fonner is 
plannable, while the latter is not, which ought to make us think offuturate readings. 
"Futurate" is the tenn for a kind of reference to the future that is (quite roughly) 
possible with plannable events, but impossible with unplannable eventualities (Vetter, 
1979; Dowty, 1979, Copley, 2000), as in (47). 
(47) The Red Sox are playing/*beating the Yankees tomorrow. 
The futurate pattern of judgments - good with plannable eventualities, bad with 
unplannable eventualities - shows up for progressives only when the ongoing, present 
reading is ruled out. For example, (48) is good whether the eventuality is plannable or 
not. It is only when there is a future adverbial, as in (47), that the characteristic pattern of 
judgments is discernible. 
(48) The Red Sox are playinglbeating the Yankees right now. 
In Copley (2001) I argue that bgt, having a progressive, has both an "ongoing future" and 
a "futurate future" reading. If we can rule out the ongoing future reading, we should be 
able to see the futurate judgment pattern. 
The most plausible explanation for the fact in (46), I believe, is that the MWO 
rules out wgt on the ongoing future reading, but not on the futurate future reading. And in 
support of this hypothesis, it does appear that in (46a) the only reading is one where there 
was, at some previous time, a plan that Pedro would pitch the following day. 
Why WOUldn't the MWO rule out the futurate reading? The answer may have to 
do with the "M" in the MWO. The MWO does not hold in embedded contexts, as in 
(49a), where wall VP is evaluated on John's belief worlds; (49a) does not entail (49b). 
(49) a. 
b. 
John believed that Mary would go. 
Mary went. 
If we were to give a modal semantics for futurate readings, then in the futurate reading, 
wall Q would be evaluated on, speaking casually, the planned worlds, not the actual 
world. In that case, the MWO would not be expected to hold for the futurate reading. But 
in the ongoing reading, wall Q would be evaluated on the actual world, so it would still 
be expected to run afoul of the MWO. This would explain why the futurate pattern of 
judgments shows up; the ongoing reading is ruled out. 
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This similarity between would and wgt can plausibly be assumed to be because 
they share a similar means of referring to the future. For the sake of comparison, note that 
past modals and past progressive futurates do not obey the MWO; a continuation 
asserting that the eventuality didn't happen does not result in a contradiction. 
(50) a. Pedro was supposed to pitch against the Yankees, but in the end he 
didn't. 
b. (At that point) Pedro might have pitched/was pitching against the 
Yankees, but in the end he didn't. 
So if both would and one of the readings of wgt obey the MWO, it is not just because 
they both involve future reference, but must be because they both refer to the future by 
the same, or at least similar, means. 
One other commonality is that both will and bgt share the property of being 
felicitous under verbs such as predict, as Presque (2001) points out. Sentences without 
these are not felicitous, even if they make reference to the future in other ways. 
(51) From Presque (2001) 
a. Mary predicts that John will push the button. 
b. Mary predicts that John is going to push the button. 
c. *Mary predicts that John pushes the button. 
d. *Mary predicts that John is pushing the button. 
e. *Mary predicts that John pushed the button. 
f. *Mary predicts that John was pushing the button. 
To Presque's list we can also add modals: 
(52) a. *Mary predicts that John may pushlbe pushing the button. 
b. *Mary predicts that John is supposed to pushlbe pushing the button. 
This is again evidence that will and bgt share the same, or at least similar, means of 
refering to the future. Though it may be mysterious why predict is able to distinguish 
between the future reference of will and bgt on the one hand, and other kinds of future 
reference on the other hand, Along with the facts about the MWO, this should allow us to 
go altead with the hypothesis that the same future element figures in both will and bgt. 
To conclude this section: I have argued, first of alI, that the future operator in bgt 
must be indeterministic, because putting a deterministic future under a progressive yields 
the wrong results. Secondly, I have shown that the future operator in will/would and the 
one in b gt share two semantic properties that are not shared by other means of future 
reference. I take this as evidence that the future operator in will/would and the future 
operator in bgt are in fact the same entity. 
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3 Conclusion 
Conditional data show that there is good reason to think that bgt consists of some kind of 
progressive plus a future operator. The future operator in this configuration can only be 
indeterministic; evidence that it is the same future operator as wall, the future operator in 
will means that wall must be indeterministic. 
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